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Abstract
In the 1990s, 600,000 to 1 million North Koreans, or about 3 to 5 percent of the precrisis population, perished in 
one of the worst famines of the 20th century.North Korea is once again poised on the brink of famine. Although 
the renewed provision of aid is likely to avert a disaster on the scale of the 1990s, hunger-related deaths are already 
occurring and a dynamic has been set in motion that will carry the crisis into 2009. North Korea is a complex 
humanitarian emergency characterized by highly imperfect information. This paper triangulates quantity and price 
evidence with direct observation to assess food insecurity in North Korea and its causes. We critique the widely 
cited UN figures and present original data on grain quantities and prices. These data demonstrate that for the first 
time since the 1990s famine, the aggregate grain balance has gone into deficit. Prices have also risen steeply. The 
reemergence of pathologies from the famine era is documented through direct observation. Although exogenous 
shocks have played a role, foreign and domestic policy choices have been key.
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INTRODUCTION
Imperfect and asymmetric information poses an ongoing challenge to the management of complex 
humanitarian emergencies. Often for political reasons—including authoritarian rule, breakdown of 
central authority, or civil conflict—donors face problems assessing the causes and extent of distress in 
recipient countries. These conditions frustrate the formulation of effective relief strategies.
North Korea is an example. During the 1990s, 600,000 to 1 million North Koreans, or about 3 
to 5 percent of the precrisis population, perished in one of the worst famines of the 20th century. The 
closed nature of the regime made it nearly impossible for the outside world to recognize the onset of food 
distress and for aid to enter the country in a timely and targeted way.1 The country is again experiencing 
signs of severe food shortages, and although more information is available than in the past, it remains 
imperfect and politicized. 
The current cycle of distress can be traced back to late 2005. On the back of improving harvests 
and generous outside aid, the government attempted to ban the private trade in grain; in doing so, it 
criminalized the primary mechanism through which most North Korean families obtained food. The 
regime also sought to revive the state-run public distribution system (PDS) of quantity rationing, in 
part by confiscating grain in rural areas.2 The government also threatened to expel the World Food 
Programme (WFP), incapacitating the outside world’s early warning system.
High politics has also played an important role in recent shortages. More than two-thirds of the 
grain consumed in North Korea is produced locally (figure 1). Domestic production is highly dependent 
on fertilizer, however, much of which has been donated by South Korea in recent years. Following missile 
and nuclear tests in 2006, South Korea suspended fertilizer shipments; predictably, North Korean grain 
production fell. Food aid also dried up, and with global food prices rising, the regime’s capacity to import 
grain on commercial terms also withered. 
These policy-derived shocks were certainly exacerbated by adverse weather, as the country 
experienced flooding in 2006 and 2007, concentrated in grain-growing regions of the southwest. Yet as 
this brief narrative suggests, exogenous shocks in the form of both weather and rising world prices must be 
seen in the context of a wider political economy that involves both foreign and domestic policy choices. 
In this paper, we triangulate between three sources of information—grain quantities, prices, and 
1 More detailed background can be found in Noland (2000, 2004a, 2004b); Noland, Robinson, and Wang (2001); 
and Haggard and Noland (2007) and sources cited therein.
2 In August 2005, the government decided to reinstate the PDS as of October 1 and to ban private trading in grain. 
Implementation was uneven and eventually the government was forced to quietly shelve the policy as PDS sites were 
not able to meet targets and markets for grain began to reemerge. These developments coincided with reports of the 
government forcibly extracting food in contravention of the rules determining the disposition of cooperative farm 
output following the 2005 harvest.
direct observation—to assess the extent of distress and its causes. We begin with a reconstruction of 
aggregate food balances and show that recently released United Nations estimates of the production 
shortfall are almost certainly exaggerated. Nonetheless, even after making appropriate adjustments, we 
find that for the first time since the 1990s famine, the aggregate grain balance has gone into deficit. We 
show that the decline in aggregate supply predates the floods of 2007 and the onset of rising world food 
prices in 2007–08. 
A central contribution of this paper is to match these aggregate balances with a consideration 
of the evolution of prices over the last three years. Prices have assumed increased salience due to 
fundamental changes in the North Korean food economy. The famine era collapse of the PDS encouraged 
entrepreneurial coping behavior and the emergence of markets. Food security is increasingly a function of 
household financial status as the PDS has receded in importance and food is increasingly accessed via the 
market.
Employing an original dataset of more than 600 grain-price observations, we map the path of prices 
against a number of potential drivers and show that while exogenous shocks, including floods and rising 
world-market prices, affect prices, reckless policies have played an important role as well. Moreover, some 
external constraints facing North Korea are themselves endogenous to political choices by the North 
Korean leadership, including those regarding relations with the WFP, the country’s nuclear ambitions, 
and other foreign policy provocations. The latter are responsible for cuts in South Korean food and 
fertilizer aid and thus have both directly and indirectly affected available grain supplies. 
In combination, these factors suggest a somewhat different approach to the political economy 
of famine than is visible in the extant literature. Rather than focusing solely on the domestic political 
determinants of famine, such as authoritarian rule (Sen 1981) or the presence of antifamine political 
compacts (de Waal 1997), we also need to consider how governments relate to the outside world. In 
North Korea’s case, a foreign policy that emphasized economic autarky and a confrontational foreign 
policy combined to limit the access to external sources of supply in times of need. 
I FOOD BALANCES
The conventional starting point for assessing food needs is a quantity balance sheet.3 Total need consists 
of requirements for human consumption, seed, feed, industrial uses (including the manufacture of 
alcohol), and losses and spoilage. Domestic supply consists of production and any drawdown on 
accumulated stocks. The gap between domestic needs and supply is the uncovered food balance, which 
3 This section draws on Haggard and Noland (2008), which provides extensive documentation of the primary 
source materials.
must be met through commercial imports or aid. Each of these components is uncertain in the North 
Korean case. Analysts estimate human consumption by imputing per capita consumption or caloric 
intake (controlling for the heterogeneity of need across demographic groups) and multiplying that 
estimate by the population. Unfortunately, considerable uncertainty surrounds the size of the North 
Korean population; the most recent population census data pertain to 1993, that is, before the famine 
that may have killed a nontrivial share of the population (Eberstadt 2007, chapter 2). It appears that at 
times during the 1990s the Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Programme (FAO/
WFP) overestimated population (and hence consumption needs), in part because of the ravages of the 
famine itself.4 
Moreover, there is also no consensus about the North Korean diet, and differing assumptions 
regarding caloric needs and nutritional sources can generate significantly different estimates of human 
needs. Heather Smith’s (1998, 57) comprehensive analysis of North Korea’s historical consumption 
patterns of all food categories concludes that “the share of rice and maize in total cereal intake has 
historically been much lower than assumed by international agencies” and that the cereals consumption 
figure adopted by the FAO/WFP probably overstated the role of rice and corn in the North Korean diet 
by approximately 20 percent (figure 1).5 
Total requirements must also account for seed, livestock feed, industrial uses such as the 
manufacture of alcohol, and postharvest losses. Seed is a relatively small component, but livestock feed 
is significant and has exhibited substantial change. The initial 1995 FAO/WFP assessment estimated 
feed requirements at 1.4 million metric tons (MMT) of cereal, well above Kim, Lee, and Sumner’s 
(1998) estimate of 584,000 metric tons (MT) for a typical year. Subsequent reports (corroborated by 
eyewitness accounts) described culling of livestock on the order of “30 to 90 percent,”6 “more than half,”7 
and “most,”8 and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reported that “livestock and 
4 The initial FAO/WFP assessment released in December 1995 implied that the population was just over 22 
million. In the November 1997 food balance calculation the FAO/WFP assumed that mid-1998 population would 
be 23.5 million. As a point of comparison the South Korean government’s estimate was 21.9 million. By June 
1999, however, it was apparent that famine mortality was of such a magnitude that it was germane to calculations 
of overall demand. Food balances were subsequently recalculated based on an official North Korean government 
population estimate of 22.55 million for August 1999, amounting to a downward revision of nearly one million 
people from the FAO/WFP’s previous assumption. The population issue emerged again in 2008, when assessment 
teams were only able to access areas accounting for less than 20 million people, while the putative population of the 
country was 24 million.
5 Hazel Smith (2008) provides a counterargument that because of its cold climate, caloric intake needs in North 
Korea are actually higher than those specified by the UN agencies. 
6 FAO/WFP (1996a, 3).
7 FAO/WFP (1996b, 3).
8 FAO/WFP (1997, 2). This report also observes that the extensive culling of livestock should have, at least 
poultry populations fell dramatically after the floods.”9 As a consequence of these reductions in herd size, 
the estimated feed requirement was cut to 600,000 MT for the 1996–97 marketing year and 300,000 
for the 1997–98 marketing year, where it remained constant for a number of years. Yet in the 2003–04 
assessment, the FAO/WFP reported a figure on feed demand provided by the North Korean agriculture 
ministry of 178,000 MT, despite the fact that the FAO/WFP was reporting that the herds had been 
substantially restocked. In other words, over the course of a decade, the estimated feed requirement fell by 
more than 1 MMT—from nearly a quarter of total use to less than 5 percent—despite a reported increase 
in herd size. We make this observation not to belittle the analysts at the FAO and WFP but to illustrate 
the magnitude of uncertainty surrounding important components of aggregate demand. 
Finally, consider postharvest losses. Early FAO/WFP calculations assumed that these were relatively 
minor, but they were raised to 12 percent of production for the 1997–98 balance sheet, and 15 percent 
the following year. By assumption they have remained constant since, despite North Korean government 
attempts to reduce them. This relative constancy reflects in part political negotiations among the WFP, 
the FAO, and the North Korean government and is without serious empirical foundation; recent FAO/
WFP reports openly acknowledge as much.10 
As a consequence of these various sources of uncertainty, differences among need estimates are 
extraordinarily large, ranging from a relatively expansive 6.5 MMT (from the [South] Korea Rural 
Development Administration [KRDA])11 to a highly compressed, minimum human need requirement 
of roughly 3 MMT (our calculations). Consumption at this highly compressed level would certainly not 
avoid hunger; food would have to be distributed precisely across the population, an outcome that is both 
logistically and politically implausible (Haggard and Noland 2007).
How about supply? The biggest single component of supply is domestic production (figure 1). Since 
production cannot be measured directly, outside observers impute it by combining estimates of planted 
acreage and yields. Yields pose more challenges than acreage, which can be observed through satellite 
imagery. The South Korean government estimates yields by operating experimental farms mimicking 
temporarily, increased the supply of meat and thereby reduced demands for other foods.
9 The UNDP report goes on to quantify these losses: “Data gathered for the purposes of this study indicate a 
reduction of 37 percent of cattle, 36 percent for sheep and goats. More importantly, grain eating pig and poultry 
populations declined by 57 percent and 90 percent, respectively” (UNDP 1998, 16).
10 For example, the Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Programme states that “the level of 
postharvest crop loss in DPR Korea has been a contentious issue in recent years, with estimates ranging from 2 
percent to as high as 30 percent. Unfortunately, none is based on quantified investigation” (FAO/WFP 2003, 
17–18). The following year’s report reads: “The level of post-harvest crop loss in DPR Korea has been a contentious 
issue in recent years, with estimates ranging from 3 percent to more than 30 percent. Unfortunately, no systematic 
investigations have been taken to clarify the issue” (FAO/WFP 2004, 15).
11 Park Hyun Min, “Food Provisions Will Be 2.49 Million Tons Short Next Year,” DailyNK, December 15, 2007.
North Korean agricultural techniques. The FAO uses selective field sampling to generate estimates of 
yields, but the organization is also diplomatically constrained to recognize North Korean official data. 
This is an important constraint insofar as North Korea has tended to understate supply during bad times 
to maximize assistance. In the spring of 2008, for example, the FAO downwardly revised its estimate of 
the previous harvest by a whopping 25 percent.12
Estimating imports is also challenging. North Korea treats trade data as a state secret, and a 
number of the country’s trade partners—most notably China—are circumspect about revealing their aid 
commitments. But the magnitude of discrepancies across external sources on imports and aid is smaller 
than with respect to domestic production. It is possible to track most aid, including the share passing 
through the WFP. As shown in figure 1, aid has been volatile during recent years, and its shrinkage is an 
important contributor to the decline in aggregate supply. 
Lastly, it is possible that North Korea could be running down accumulated stocks, including stocks 
reserved for the military. There is disagreement as to the size of these putative stocks and North Korea’s 
management of them, although recent reports have suggested a release of military stocks around the time 
that prices peaked in early 2008. However, the consensus is that the release of stocks is unlikely to have 
had a large quantitative impact on the balance sheet although, as we will see, they can have a temporary 
impact on prices.13
Figure 2 reports two alternative estimates of North Korea’s uncovered grain needs. One is 
constructed from FAO/WFP figures. The other adjusts these estimates on the supply side by substituting 
US Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates of North Korean production for the FAO estimate 
and adjusts the demand side to reflect the South Korean government’s estimate of the North Korean 
population and the Heather Smith-adjusted estimates of human consumption.14 
The UN series are not plausible. According to these figures, North Korea has avoided food shortages 
12 Other estimates of current grain output range from 4.01 MMT to a low of 2.5 MMT; all assessments point 
to a sharp decline in output. At the higher end of the production estimates, KRDA shows a decline in total food 
equivalent of 500,000 MT between the 2006 and 2007 harvests, from 4.48 MMT to 4.01 MMT or 11 percent. 
The US Department of Agriculture estimates show a more modest decline in output but from a lower starting 
point: from 3.49 MMT to 3.32 MMT. The FAO revision marks a large reduction not only from the 4 MMT of the 
previous year but also from the five-year average of 3.7 MMT. Finally, at the low end, Good Friends has cited an 
estimate of total output of 2.5 MMT but without extensive justification of sources or methods. 
13 On the putative size of military stockpiles, see Noland (2000, box 5.2). Pomnyun (2008) and Good Friends 
(2008) report that the government released military stocks in the spring of 2007, while Lee Sung Jin and Moon 
Sung Hwee report that military stocks were released in May 2008 at the time when prices were peaking. See Lee 
Sung Jin, “Military Provisions Released to the Cadres,” Daily NK, May 6, 2008; and Moon Sung Hwee, “North 
Korean National Defense Commission Orders Distribution of Wartime Food Reserves to the Army,” Daily NK, May 
27, 2008.
14 Using South Korean government estimates of North Korean output would yield a very similar picture to the 
one derived from USDA data. These two series track each other closely but are significantly different from the FAO 
series.
in only one of the last 12 years—2000—and then only barely. If North Korea really experienced the 
shortfalls depicted in these data, it would have experienced famine. The adjusted figures tell a more 
plausible story. The very large food deficits during the famine period in the mid-1990s were followed by 
a modest agricultural recovery and small surpluses. After 2005, however, the combination of declining 
domestic production and more erratic aid pushed available supply below even adjusted total needs for 
the first time since the famine. By spring 2008, the wolf really was at the door. A consideration of prices 
provides additional information both on the extent of distress and some of its causes. 
II EVIDENCE FROM PRICES
North Korean authorities impede the collection and dissemination of price data. Nonetheless, 
increasingly active nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the growing availability of cell phones 
in the Chinese border region have facilitated the monitoring of price trends. These data are assembled 
primarily from observations reported in Good Friends’ publication North Korea Today, NKNet’s 
DailyNK, and other Korean-language academic and media sources.15 As with all data on and from North 
Korea, these series too should be treated with caution. The data are spotty, markets are fragmented, and 
we have little information on quality differences. It is also likely that the actual collection of the data 
is endogenous: More effort is placed on collecting and disseminating data during periods of stress or 
concern about the food situation, both secularly and seasonally (figure 3). As a consequence the series that 
we have constructed may well exhibit upward bias and greater volatility relative to the “true” price series.16 
A scatter plot of more than 600 observations of corn and rice prices from 19 North Korean cities 
15 Good Friends is a Buddhist charity, which has long been involved in refugee and famine relief work in North 
Korea. It has taken an aggressive line with regard to the magnitude of problems facing North Korea: Based on a 
network of informants claimed to include North Korean government officials, it asserts that North Korea faces 
a food shortage of 1.8 MMT and that 200,000 to 300,000 lives could be lost in 2008 due to renewed famine 
(Pomnyun 2008). (The Good Friends estimate of the food shortage [1.8 MMT] is particularly striking insofar as 
they estimate that the population of North Korea is only 20 million due to 4 million famine-related deaths in the 
1990s.) NKNet, which includes a significant number of North Korean refugees or defectors, has generally taken 
a more skeptical line, arguing that it is hard to assess the actual magnitude of the shortage and estimating excess 
mortality on the order of 100 to 1,000 through June 2008, though even NKNet reports disturbing developments, 
including the exhaustion of rations for some military units (Moon Sung Hwee, “North Korean National Defense 
Commission Orders Distribution of Wartime Food Reserves to the Army,” DailyNK, May 27, 2008). 
16 One might think of this as a situation where the observed price, po, is the sum of the true price (determined 
by supply and demand fundamentals), pf, and a random component, e, either measurement error or short-run 
fluctuations that are orthogonal to q and its determinants E(e|pf)=0, i.e. po=pf+e. In the case at hand there are two 
potential sources of bias. There may be a tendency to disproportionately collect data on observations with big 
realizations of e (so E(e)>0). It may also be the case that there is a similar tendency to disproportionately pick up 
observations with large positive values of e when pf is small (so E(e|pf)=f(pf) with f´(pf)<0). Both tendencies would 
upwardly bias both the mean and variance of the observed relative to the true series of prices.
over the period from June 2004 to August 2008 is reported in figure 4. A reasonably consistent time series 
was constructed for eight cities,17 interpolating between missing observations, and an index of grain prices 
was formed with corn and rice each receiving 50 percent weights. This index, along with the FAO index of 
world grain prices, is reported in figure 5 together with the timing of nine events of potential significance 
to the trajectory of prices since the fall of 2005 (summarized in table 1). Two of these events are weather 
related: the floods in July 2006 and August 2007. The remainder, however, are domestic policy actions or 
developments in the external political and economic environment. In chronological order, we include: the 
October 2005 ban on private trade in grain and the revival of the PDS; the October 9, 2006 detonation 
of a nuclear device and the subsequent imposition of UN sanctions on October 14, 2006; the April 2007 
tightening of internal trade restrictions18; the December 2007 imposition of export controls by China in 
response to rising domestic food prices (which coincided with a North Korean ban on trading activities by 
younger women); the reported May 14, 2008 release of military stocks and the nearly coincidental May 
15, 2008 afternoon announcement (US time) of the provision of US food aid (i.e., May 18, Korea time); 
and the June 30, 2008 arrival in Nampo of the first shipment of US food aid. The mapping of these events 
against the timeline of prices provides some suggestive evidence as to the drivers of price movements. 
In sifting through these possible influences, it is important to underline some expected seasonality 
in the data. We expect prices to decline following the fall harvest and to rise in the spring, the traditional 
“lean season” prior to the summer harvest of potatoes and some secondary grains. The July 2006 floods 
generate the first noticeable inflection point in the price series, producing a 37 percent increase in prices 
between July and September 2006. The nuclear weapon test and UN sanctions the following month 
do not appear to have sufficient impact to reverse the seasonal pattern of postharvest price decline. In 
the aftermath of the July 2006 missile tests the South Korean government limited food and fertilizer 
shipments, but these shipments resumed following a breakthrough in the nuclear negotiations in 
early 2007. Food shipments might be expected to have a relatively immediate effect on prices, but the 
consequences of the interruption of fertilizer are more indirect; reduced availability and application of 
fertilizer has delayed effects via the size of the subsequent harvest, which was also affected by the floods.
The data indicate that North Korean grain prices have outstripped either overall inflation or world 
grain prices, quadrupling between May 2007 and May 2008 alone; although world market prices set a 
floor under North Korean prices, country-specific effects were clearly at play. Prices declined following 
the announcement of the resumption of large-scale assistance and the possible release of military 
stockpiles but did not converge fully to world prices. 
With respect to the timing of these increases, it is important to note that prices had already begun 
17 They are Chungjin, Haeju, Hamheung, Hoeryong, Onsung, Pyongyang, Sariwon, and Sineuiju.
18 See Haggard, Noland, and Weeks (2008) for details. 
to accelerate more rapidly than world market prices before the August 2007 floods hit, possibly reflecting 
the secular decline in aggregate supply and uncertainty regarding the ultimate resolution of the nuclear 
issue and the resumption of external support in particular. The rapid increase in prices continued through 
mid-May 2008, apparently accelerating around April 2008. Although caution is warranted in drawing 
precise inferences, the high point in prices coincided with a near perfect storm of exogenous and self-
inflicted shocks. Externally, world market prices were cresting, but the constraints facing North Korea 
were political as well as economic. China was also restricting exports of grain and fertilizer in an effort to 
contain domestic inflation; Beijing, increasingly disaffected with North Korean behavior, was unwilling 
to play the role of lender of last resort, which it had in the past. The elections in the South had stalemated 
North–South Korean relations—and aid—but the US promise of assistance had not yet materialized. 
In both cases, North Korea’s failure to be completely forthcoming in negotiations over the status of its 
nuclear program played a role.  
Internally, the government sought to cope with rising prices by imposing a variety of restrictions 
on market activity: price controls, restrictions on who could trade in the market, and crackdowns on 
corruption in cross-border trade (Haggard, Noland, and Weeks 2008). These actions also had the 
unintended consequence of driving up the risk premium on trade and producing the kind of speculative 
activity that frequently accompanies prefamine and famine conditions.
Prices peaked the following month, falling dramatically after the US aid announcement and the 
rumored release of military stocks, presumably due to sellers’ dumping of inventory in anticipation of 
significant new supplies coming into the market. The market appeared to overshoot slightly, possibly 
reflecting both an overestimate of stocks released into the market and a lack of understanding of the 
regulatory and logistic impediments to the United States quickly delivering large amounts of food aid. 
These impediments included the requirement that US aid be primarily sourced in the United States and 
shipped on US-flagged vessels; the failure of the expected Japanese release of rice stocks to materialize; 
and the implicit links between the provision of aid and progress on the nuclear front, which was slow in 
coming. 
Two other aspects of the price evidence bear mentioning. The first is spatial. There is a high 
correlation of price movements across provinces and across cities. Figure 6 reports provincial corn 
prices, again interpolating between observations. (In the interests of brevity, the equivalent chart for 
rice, which yields quite similar results, is not reported.) Indeed, there appears to be some diminution of 
crossprovincial price dispersion over time, as measured by the crossprovincial coefficients of variation 
(figure 7). It is possible that this could be a spurious result, reflecting the relative paucity of observations 
during the early part of the sample period. But the hypothesis of price equality across major cities cannot 
generally be rejected for 2008 data, reinforcing the notion that there has been a narrowing of spatial 0
price dispersion and a possible integration of markets (table 2). As a result, crossprovincial and crosscity 
patterns of price movement do not reveal any obvious patterns. Provinces bordering China, which might 
be expected to have better access to imports, do not exhibit uniquely low or stable prices relative to the 
rest of the country. The Northeast, which was disfavored by the government during the first famine, does 
not appear unique. And perhaps most interestingly, Pyongyang does not appear immune to trends in 
prices, a fact that at least suggests generalized distress. 
The second observation concerns relative prices. As the real price of rice rises, households shift to 
less preferred grains such as corn, barley, and millet, and, in the worst case, turn to grasses and foraging 
of other plant sources for food. Figure 8 shows that the price of corn relative to rice began rising around 
the time of the 2007 floods, rising again with the tightening of trading activities. The corn-rice price 
ratio fell with the aid announcement and rumors of military stock releases but then rose again, ultimately 
increasing more than 75 percent in the index of eight major cities, from 0.34 in mid-August 2007 to a 
peak of 0.60 in July 2008, the highest value since the series began in 2004, before stabilizing. This rise in 
the price of corn relative to rice is another sign of intensifying distress.
III DIRECT OBSERVATION
The quantity and price evidence presented thus far can be used to make indirect inferences about distress 
in North Korea. Obviously, it would be desirable to have direct observation, particularly in the North 
Korean case where considerable evidence documents the nonuniformity of distress across geographical 
regions and political-economic classes. Unfortunately, the North Korean government systematically 
impedes the access of foreign observers, including relief agencies, rendering even their efforts to collect 
systematic data on conditions suspect (Haggard and Noland 2007). However, the deepening of the North 
Korean food emergency was accompanied by an intensification of surreptitious activities by South Korean 
NGOs, most notably Good Friends and NKNet, which have generated anecdotal accounts of conditions 
in North Korea via networks of informants. 
Moreover, we now have access to assessments carried out by the WFP and a consortium of US 
NGOs in conjunction with the large-scale aid program finalized in 2008 (Anderson and Majarowitz 2008, 
WFP 2008). The American NGOs evaluated conditions in two provinces in the northwest, North Pyongan 
and Chagang, while the UN agencies were responsible for evaluating conditions in the rest of the country. 
While access was generally better than in the past, it remained constrained and the assessment 
was therefore not entirely systematic. Assessment teams were not allowed to visit markets. North 
Korean authorities selected the households and institutions to be visited, were present during the 
interviews, sometimes objected to or declined to translate certain questions as inappropriate, and would 
sometimes interrupt or correct respondents’ answers. The teams were unable to conduct any formal 
anthropomorphic studies as have been carried out in the past and were required to accept official 
statistical claims at face value. 
Nonetheless, the assessments corroborate the quantity and price evidence presented here. PDS 
rations had been cut from a target of 500 to 600 grams to 150 grams or 700 kilocalories per day over 
the 2007–08 crop cycle. This rapid decline implies that an increasing share of demand is being met 
through the market, as confirmed in household interviews; sole reliance on state-administered provisions 
would otherwise portend massive famine. Increased marketization also underscores the salience of the 
price increases: Hunger is now driven not only by the collapse of the PDS but also by rapidly increasing 
real grain prices. The WFP reports that three-quarters of households have reduced their food intake (90 
percent in the case of PDS recipient households), and more than half consume only two meals a day, 
though given the constraints on the assessment process, one cannot know how representative this sample 
is. On the supply side, both WFP and NGO interviews with local officials indicated that prospects for the 
upcoming harvest were uncertain due to lack of inputs, including fertilizer, fuel, and electricity; decreased 
worker capacity or effort; and possible diversion of effort to unregulated plots. Local officials interviewed 
by the NGO team indicated that cereal stocks would be completely exhausted in 24 of 25 counties visited 
by the end of June 2008.19
Apart from corroborating observable macro trends, the assessments also document the re-emergence 
of pathologies from the famine era. On the demand side, the WFP reports that more than 70 percent 
of households are collecting wild foods, a 20 percent increase from 2003–05; this finding is consistent 
with evidence of a shift in demand toward less preferred cereals (and the sharp increase in corn-rice 
price ratios), which was confirmed in the household interviews. Eighty percent of PDS-dependent 
households report receiving assistance from relatives or friends compared with 60 percent in 2003–05. 
These consumption patterns are manifested in interviews with doctors and other informants who revealed 
modest increases in malnutrition, low birth weight, infant mortality, and decreased work and school 
attendance. 
The WFP also identifies specific socioeconomic groups prone to food insecurity. Consistent with 
prior historical experience, shortages are not limited to the flood-affected areas but include the cities of the 
industrial northeast. These findings suggest both the difficulties facing urban residents reliant on market 
sources of supply and the breakdown of within-country transfers due to rising fuel and transportation 
19 However, the WFP also documents a significant increase in livestock, though the pattern appears complex. 
The biggest increases are among PDS-dependent households raising goats and rabbits, which subsist on grass, as a 
coping behavior. There are reports, particularly in the northeast, of herds being culled due to lack of feed. Under 
conditions of widening inequality, it is quite possible that these coping responses coexist with an increase in livestock 
production to meet the demands of the well-to-do.
costs and intensified restrictions on market activities.20 Increased vulnerability of the rustbelt industrial 
proletariat as well as flood-affected farmers, together with a disintegration of the normal transfer process, 
were precisely the conditions that gave rise to the generalized distress of the 1990s famine (Haggard and 
Noland 2007).
IV CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined three sorts of evidence—grain quantities, prices, and direct observation—
concerning the evolution of the North Korean food economy. Three conclusions stand out. In 2008 
the aggregate balance between grain requirements and supply slipped into deficit for the first time since 
the 1990s famine. The decline in aggregate sources of supply is the result not only of exogenous shocks 
but also of the decline in aid, which in turn reflects diplomatic conflicts between North Korea and the 
international community. Domestic production has been adversely affected by cuts in the concessional 
deliveries of fertilizer, fuel, and other inputs, while aid has been directly affected by North Korean foreign 
policy behavior. Rising global grain prices constitute an adverse development, but their impact has been 
exacerbated by the reluctance of the government to undertake reforms of the external sector that would 
permit more robust commercial imports.
Second, prices have risen steeply, and by magnitudes that cannot be explained by either domestic 
inflation or the increase in world grain prices alone. Bad weather has undoubtedly affected prices, but 
prices were already on an upward trajectory before the 2007 floods, reflecting a sharp drop in assistance 
from South Korea and other donors and North Korean policies that disrupted or rendered uncertain the 
functioning of domestic markets.
Finally, the declining significance of the PDS as a source of food—documented through direct 
observation—coupled with rising prices suggests a fundamental difference from the 1990s famine. During 
that episode the incidence of distress was a proximate function of the collapse of the PDS. The current 
emergency, in which the market plays a more prominent role, is more akin to prefamine situations in 
market economies where access to food is determined by economic status.
Although hunger-related deaths are occurring, we doubt that the current episode will come close to 
matching the 1990s famine for two reasons. First, during that episode, famine or prefamine conditions 
had emerged as early as 1993. But it was not until 1995, with a full-blown famine under way, that the 
government appealed for help, and it then took nearly six months before aid of any magnitude started 
20 “The team found that the seven counties visited try to be as self-reliant as possible in food provision: in fact in 
three counties they did not receive any commodities from other counties or provinces in 2007” (Anderson and 
Majarowitz 2008, 8).
to arrive. During the 2005–08 cycle, aid has been vulnerable to political constraints. But the global 
community has gained access to information such as that presented in this paper and the response to 
distress has been timelier as a result. 
Second, even in its degraded state, the marketization of the North Korean economy has probably 
reduced vulnerability from what it would have otherwise been. Even with rapidly rising prices, markets—
including those fed by cross-border trade in grain with China—are able to ameliorate internal supply 
constraints to some extent. That said, North Korea has experienced an intensification of long-standing 
problems of malnutrition and hunger-related deaths. Moreover, the lack of fertilizer and the consequent 
possibility of a weak fall harvest in 2008, continuing constraints on commercial imports, and the 
vacillating policy response of the government will carry the emergency into 2009 if not beyond.
Our analysis suggests an important role for political economy in the understanding of food 
emergencies, but a political economy that encompasses both domestic and foreign policies and the 
external sector. The long-run solution to North Korea’s chronic food insecurity lies in a political 
settlement of the nuclear issue and reforms that would open and revitalize the industrial economy. These 
reforms would allow North Korea to export industrial products, earn foreign exchange, and import 
bulk grains on a commercially sustainable basis, just as its neighbors South Korea, Japan, and China do. 
The outstanding question is whether such reform can be achieved by the incumbent government, as the 
Chinese Communist Party was able to do, or whether the foreign and domestic policy commitments of 
the current regime prohibit the policy innovations that would avert such distress in the future.
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Figure 1     North Korean food balances, 1995–96 to 2007–08
Sources: Aid—UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) data until 00/0, authors’ calculations thereafter; imports—average 
of FAO, US Department of Agriculture (USDA), and UN Comtrade data; domestic production—USDA; adjusted total demand and 
adjusted human demand—authors’ calculations using FAO data; total demand and human demand—FAO.
  Haggard-Noland-Weeks estimate
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Figure 2     North Korea’s uncovered grain needs, 1995–96 to 2007–08
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Figure 5     North Korean grain prices






.  0/00:  Ban on private trade in grain and revival of PDS
.  //0–//0:  Floods
.  0//0:  Nuclear test and imposition of UN sanctions
.  /00:  Imposition of restrictions on trading
.  //0–//0:  Floods
.  //0:  Introduction of Chinese export controls, North Korean ban on trading 
activities
.  //0:  Tightened control on trading activities
.  //0:  Military stocks reportedly ordered released
  //0:  US aid announcement
.  /0/0:  Arrrival of first US aid shipment at Nampo0
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Figure 6     Corn price by province, 2004–08
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Figure 6     Corn price by province, 2004–08
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Figure 7     Coefficient of variation of grain prices across provinces, 2004–08
Corn
Rice
.  0/00:  Ban on private trade in grain and revival of PDS
.  //0–//0:  Floods
.  0//0:  Nuclear test and imposition of UN sanctions
.  /00:  Imposition of restrictions on trading
.  //0–//0:  Floods
.  //0:  Introduction of Chinese export controls, North Korean ban on trading 
activities
.  //0:  Tightened control on trading activities
.  //0:  Military stocks reportedly ordered released
  //0:   US aid announcement
.  /0/0:  Arrrival of first US aid shipment at Nampo
Figure 8     North Korean corn-rice price ratio











Table 1     Possible price shocks, 2005–08
Date Event Anticipated effect on prices
October , 00 Ban on private trade in grain and revival of the public 
distribution system
+
July –, 00 Floods +
October –, 00 Nuclear test and imposition of UN sanctions +
April 00 Imposition of restrictions on trading +
August –, 00 Floods +
December , 00 Chinese export controls and North Korean restrictions 
on age of women traders in the market
+
April , 00 Tightened control on trading activity  + 
May –, 00 Reported release of military stocks and  
announcement of US aid package
 –
June 0, 00 Arrival of first US aid shipment at Nampo   –
Table 2     ANOVA (analysis of variance) of corn and rice    
 prices on time periods and regions
First period  January–April 00
Second period  May–August 00
Cities included  Hamheung, Pyongyang, Sineuiju, and Wonsan
CORN
Number of observations       .000
Root MSE (mean squared error)   .
R-squared            0.
Adj. R-squared            0.0
Source F Statistic P value
Model . 0.
Second period  . 0.0
Region 0. 0.0




Number of observations .000
Root MSE (mean squared error) .
R-squared 0.
Adj. R-squared 0.
Source F Statistic P value
Model . 0.000
Second period .0 0
Region  . 0.
Interaction term of second 
period and region
0. 0.